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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
UNFAIRNESS IN U.S. HEALTH POLICY
JONATHAN OBERLANDER*
I
INTRODUCTION
The American health care system presents an intriguing paradox: it is
perennially in crisis, yet seemingly impervious to comprehensive reform.
Throughout the twentieth century, reformers repeatedly failed to enact national
health insurance.1 The most recent effort at comprehensive reform, the Clinton
administration’s Health Security Act, ended in political disaster for the
administration in 1994, with the Clinton plan failing to muster even the
minimum support necessary to bring it to a floor vote in the House or Senate,
and with the Republican party subsequently winning majorities in that year’s
midterm elections in both houses of Congress for the first time in four decades. 2
The political lesson apparently learned in Washington from the Clinton-plan
debacle was that comprehensive health reform was too politically risky to
pursue.3 Since 1994, even as conditions in the health care system have
worsened, U.S. heath policymakers have embraced a strategy of inaction and
neglect, with only the occasional interruption for incremental reforms.4 As a
result, the United States finds itself coping yet again with the familiar
combination of rising health care costs and growing numbers of uninsured. This
is not a dilemma that can be fixed by leaving the health care system to its own
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devices: without policy interventions the problems of rising costs and eroding
access to health insurance are likely to worsen substantially in coming years.
Although outrage at the inequities of U.S. health care policy, which leaves
more than fifteen percent of the population without guaranteed access to
medical care,5 is nothing new, the focus of outrage in Clark Havighurst and
Barak Richman’s searing indictment of the health system is different.6 For
Havighurst and Richman, the major source of unfairness in the system is how
health care is financed, particularly the regressive burden that health financing
arrangements impose on privately insured lower- and middle-income
Americans. At the same time, they posit that lower-income Americans are also
shortchanged on the receiving end, as well, since utilization of medical care may
vary substantially with income. Havighurst and Richman argue that this
distributive injustice means ordinary Americans are unknowingly getting a raw
deal in health care—paying proportionately more while getting less—to the
benefit of their higher-income compatriots and the health care industry.7
This article provides both a critical perspective on Havighurst and
Richman’s argument and a broader commentary on inequality and health care
politics. It focuses on the political economy of unfairness in U.S. health policy
by first highlighting the moral issues raised by our system of financing medical
care and then by analyzing the political dynamics that sustain that system. Part
II explores the moral illogic that governs American health care, paying
particular attention to the uninsured. Part III discusses the politics of U.S.
health policy and explains the difficulties in reforming even strikingly regressive
health policies. Part IV discusses the role of the tax subsidy in health politics
and the development of comprehensive health insurance. Part V explores
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and their implications for fairness in
American health care. Part VI concludes the article with an explanation of why
markets cannot ensure progressive health financing. I argue that although the
U.S. health care system is exceptionally regressive, policy solutions now in
vogue suggest it could well become even more regressive in the future, and only
a move away from market-based health policy can reverse these trends.
II
THE DUBIOUS MORAL LOGIC OF AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY
Unfairness is inarguably a cornerstone of the U.S. health care system.
Whether it is the moral philosophy Americans have consciously chosen or
inadvertently stumbled into ultimately matters little to those who suffer the
consequences of the unfairness. After all, in 2004, almost forty-six million

5. U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 2004–Highlights, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin04/hlth04asc.html (last visited March 9, 2006).
6. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Autumn 2006).
7. Id. at 8–10.
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Americans lacked health insurance,8 and they had demonstrably lower access to
medical care than insured Americans. The uninsured are found mostly in
working families9 meaning that the system fails to the extent that one believes
workers deserve health insurance as a reward for their economic contributions
to the nation’s well—being and for living up to the American work ethic.
Moreover, the uninsured are disproportionately concentrated in small
businesses;10 thus, the only sin that many of the uninsured have committed is to
work for the wrong size company. Insurance status is also a function of
occupation: workers in construction, agriculture, and the service sector are less
likely to have insurance than those employed in managerial, professional
specialty, and government jobs.11
Insurance coverage varies predictably by education and income, with lowincome and less-educated Americans significantly more likely to occupy the
ranks of the uninsured than more-affluent and -educated classes. In 2004, about
two-thirds of the uninsured lived in families with income below 200 percent of
the federal poverty line,12 or $32,180 for a family of three.13 Race and ethnicity
also play a crucial role; Hispanics’ uninsured rate is more than double that of
white Americans, while the uninsurance rate among African Americans is more
than fifty percent higher than whites.14 And age matters: Americans over age
sixty-five are entitled to join Medicare, regardless of income;15 this is the only
age group that enjoys anything approaching universal coverage in the United
States. End-stage renal disease patients also are covered by Medicare, a
peculiar organ-based eligibility that reinforces the arbitrariness of U.S. health
policy.16
Meanwhile, public insurance programs designed for the poor do not actually
cover large segments of the poor. For example, because of rules establishing
categorical eligibility for Medicaid, the government insurance program for low-

8. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5.
See COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 25–
44 (2002) for a discussion of the role of insurance in allowing access to medical case.
9. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 4
fig.3 (2006), available at http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451.pdf (reporting that 69% of the uninsured
lived in families with one or more full-time workers in 2004).
10. In 2005, 98% of firms with more than 200 workers offered health insurance to their employees,
compared with 59% of firms with fewer than 200 employees. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 13; PAUL FRONSTEIN, SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 12 fig.11 (2005),
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_IB_11-2005.pdf.
12. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at 4, 19.
13. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 70 Fed. Reg. 8,373, 8,374 (Feb. 18, 2005)
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/05fedreg.pdf (reporting $16,090 as the poverty level for a family
of three in 2005).
14. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at 19.
15. Medicare Eligibility Tool, http://www.medicare.gov/ (follow “Search Tool” hyperlink; then
follow “Find Out if You Are Eligible for Medicare and When You Can Enroll” hyperlink) (last visited
March 12, 2006).
16. Id.

12__OBERLANDER.DOC

248

3/7/2007 4:01 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:245

income Americans, childless adults usually cannot qualify for public coverage.17
Federalism also generates geographical inequities: Medicaid eligibility
standards vary by state, so low-income citizens’ access to public insurance
depends on where they live.18
To add insult to injury, the uninsured, lacking the purchasing power that
comes with being part of a large insurance pool, are sometimes charged higher
prices than insured patients.19 Medical care is also a leading cause of
bankruptcy in the United States,20 an issue not just for the uninsured but for
under-insured Americans as well.21 Even well-insured and financially secure
Americans can find themselves in financial distress if fate hands a family
member an expensive, chronic disease.22 And in perhaps the most fitting
reflection of the American health care system’s dubious moral logic, the sicker
individuals without employer-provided health insurance are, the harder it is for
them to buy health insurance.23 On the individual market, those with
preexisting conditions who are judged health risks by insurers are subject to
higher premiums, limited coverage packages, or outright coverage refusals—the
inevitable consequences of a system built on the principles of medical
underwriting and risk rating.24
None of this is especially fair and, quite apart from the normative
implications, little of it makes sense. Why should workers in small businesses
have less access to health insurance than workers in large corporations? Why
should workers who lose their jobs also lose their health insurance at precisely
the moment when they are least able to afford to purchase coverage on their
own?25 What theory of justice is at work in a system in which Americans risk

17. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at 14; Catherine
Hoffman et al., Holes in the Health Insurance System: Who Lacks Coverage and Why, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 390, 392–93 (2004).
18. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 395.
19. Uninsured American Rebekah Nix discovered this lesson the hard way when a New York
hospital billed her more than $14,000 for an appendectomy, as compared to the $2500, $5000, and $7800
it bills Health Maintenance Organizations, Medicare, and Medicaid, respectively. Lucette Lagnado,
Full Price: A Young Woman, an Appendectomy, and a $19,000 Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A1.
20. See David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-63, W5-66, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v1.pdf (finding illness or injury to be the cause
of bankruptcy in more than 25% of 1,771 people surveyed in 2001).
21. Id. at W5-63 (reporting that 75.7% of the people filing bankruptcy due to illness in 2004 were
insured).
22. For example, one middle-class family “with health insurance that covered 90% of doctor’s
bills” lost its home and filed for bankruptcy as a result of medical bills they incurred in treating its son’s
immune system disorder. John Leland, When Health Insurance Is Not a Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, at 1.
23. See Hoffman et al., supra note 17, at 392 (“Most individually purchased (i.e., non-group)
policies are expensive . . . and any preexisting health conditions are generally excluded from
coverage.”).
24. Id.; Donald Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2503, 2503–06 (1992).
25. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) provides a partial answer to
this problem. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat.
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bankruptcy if they become too sick? Or in a nation that leaves over eight
million children uninsured?26 Why should patients with kidney disease qualify
for federal health insurance while patients with a variety of other devastating
diseases do not? Any moral philosophy or social ethic that seeks equity and
compassion would have a hard time accommodating these staggering inequities.
To this familiar accounting of the moral pathologies of American health
care, Havighurst and Richman add another lament: the unfairness inherent in
the financing of private health insurance.27 They argue that premium payers are
forced to pay excessive prices because of medical providers’ monopolistic
market power, which commonly prevents even insurers from pursuing
aggressive cost control.28 Havighurst and Richman contend that in addition to
paying for monopoly profits, the insured are unknowingly paying a regressive
head tax (since the burden falls roughly equally on all premium payers rather
than varying by income), a head tax that gives nonprofit hospitals the money to
fund a range of activities, from uncompensated care and public insurers’ low
payments to research and education. They go on to argue that even if many of
these cross-subsidized missions are worthwhile (and the same holds for
financing advances in medical technology), current arrangements provide a
particularly regressive (and hidden) way of financing them. 29
Whether the injustices in health financing Havighurst and Richman describe
(such as the head tax) for the insured rise in moral importance to the problems
of the uninsured is debatable. Indeed, Havighurst and Richman’s focus on the
insured leads them at times to downplay the fate of the uninsured, who appear
at one point in their article as relatively fortunate in comparison to low-income
premium payers: because the uninsured do not have to pay insurance
premiums, Havighurst and Richman report they “have more money in their
pockets to spend on health care and other things, while also being eligible for
charitable care or personal bankruptcy in many worst-case scenarios.”30 These
“benefits” of uninsurance likely would come as a substantial surprise to the
millions of low-income Americans who want but cannot afford health insurance

82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 10, 15, 19. 29, 33, 38, 42, and 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
COBRA provides temporary health insurance for former employees when coverage is lost due to
certain statutorily defined events. Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Frequently
Asked Questions About COBRA Continuation Health Coverage, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/
faq_consumer_cobra.html (last visited March 9, 2006). However, it is more expensive because
unemployed workers have to pay up to 102% of the premiums—including amounts previously covered
by the employer—a burden that many of those who lose their job cannot afford. Id.
26. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5 (stating that in 2004, 8.3 million children were
uninsured).
27. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 10.
28. Weak purchasing power, Havighurst and Richman believe, is also a consequence of U.S.-style
health insurance’s dilution of consumers’ cost-consciousness and the absence of low-cost insurance
options that deny people the chance to economize on medical care. Id. at 14–20.
29. Id. at 20–31.
30. Id. at 72.
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and who have no guaranteed access to routine medical care and who therefore
suffer medically and financially as a result.31
Nonetheless, the uninsured and the low-income insured are in one crucial
respect two sides of the same coin, as Havighurst and Richman point out, since
both groups are victims of high and rising health insurance premiums that
threaten to price even more low- and middle-income Americans out of the
health insurance market.32 Rising medical care costs mean that many
Americans who are now insured will become uninsured in the future. Since
their fates are thus linked, there is no reason that health reform should not seek
to improve the fortunes of both groups. Attention to securing access to health
insurance should be accompanied by attention to making the financing of
American medical care more progressive, an issue that Havighurst and
Richman rightly note is too often neglected in health reform debates.
Moreover, the regressive features of health care finance that Havighurst and
Richman describe (and still others they do not emphasize) are real, and the
authors deserve credit for calling attention to these dynamics in private
insurance, which heretofore have not attracted sustained attention either in
political or policy circles. Just because people are insured does not mean that
they are faring well in the health care system, nor does it shield them from the
burdens and inequities that Havighurst and Richman discuss. To take an
example the authors do not highlight, insurance policies that charge equal
premiums have unequal distributional implications. It is hardly fair, for
instance, that the $480-a-month family premium charged by the North Carolina
state health plan to a housekeeper working at the University of North Carolina
medical school is the same as that paid by a professor of medicine. 33 Such
lower-income workers pay a greater portion of their income for health
insurance, and they thus run a higher risk of not being able to afford premiums
even when insurance is offered. Although I am not aware of empirical data
showing how widespread the practice of charging equal premiums regardless of
a worker’s income is in the private sector, it is probably safe to assume that
equal premiums are the rule rather than the exception. The exclusion from
income and payroll taxes of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums
paid on workers’ behalf compounds this regressive premium structure,
disproportionately benefiting higher-wage workers.34
Cost-sharing

31. The legal access to emergency room care provided under the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000), should not be taken in any way to mean
that the medical needs of the uninsured are adequately met.
32. LISA CLEMANS-COPE, BOWEN GARRETT & CATHERINE HOFFMAN, KAISER COMM’N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, CHANGES IN EMPLOYEES’ HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 20012005 14 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7570.pdf
33. North Carolina State Health Plan: Monthly Contribution Rates, http://www.statehealthplan.
state.nc.us/benefits/benefits_monthlyrates_new.html (last visited March 9, 2006).
34. It also cost the federal government an estimated $188.5 billion in foregone revenues in 2004.
John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004,
2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-106, W4-106, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v1.pdf.
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requirements that do not vary by income can have similarly regressive effects if
they induce lower-income workers to use fewer benefits.35
As Havighurst and Richman argue, the rising costs of health care exacerbate
these regressive tendencies. Employers pay for workers’ health care costs by
restraining growth in their wages, which helps to explain why real hourly
earnings have been largely stagnant in the United States during the past three
decades.36 The upward march of health care costs has gone on for so long that it
is easy to become numb to such consequences, especially for low-income
Americans.
Havighurst and Richman note that the injustices in financing health care
exist in a health care system of plenty. The United States spends more on
medical care than any other nation, and that spending creates both winners and
losers.37 Put bluntly, Havighurst and Richman’s argument is that health care
providers (the winners) are profiting at the expense of ordinary Americans (the
losers), who are unknowingly subsidizing, through regressive financing
arrangements, the unlimited appetite of the health care industry for more
resources. Havighurst and Richman bemoan the excess prices, monopoly
profits, and high rates of spending that finance medical providers and the supply
side of American medical care. Health care spending is the allocation of
lifestyle to providers, and American health care spending is buying, in part,
better lifestyles and incomes for our providers (as well as for our insurers, drug
companies, and so on).38 Indeed, “doctors in the United States now earn twice
what their counterparts earn in other countries”; this explains almost one-third
of the spending gap between the United States and the average G7 nation.39 In
contrast to lower-income Americans, who are often shut out of the insurance
system (or, to those who, if in it, are the unwitting victims of regressive
financing, according to Havighurst and Richman), the health care industry is
doing extraordinarily well.
That so many inequalities exist in the richest health care system in the
world,40 and that the United States appears to lead the industrialized world both
in terms of high-paid providers and the proportion of its population without
access to health insurance further illustrates the extent to which American
medical care remains a striking “paradox of excess and deprivation.”41 In this
sense—that something is fundamentally wrong in American medical care and
35. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 46–47.
36. ALEXIS M. HERMAN, FUTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 14 (1999), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/history/herman/reports/futurework/
report.htm.
37. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 11–12 n.8.
38. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation of Lifestyles to
Providers, 65 MILBANK Q. 153, 153–56, 174 (1987).
39. David M Cutler, Equality, Efficiency and Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of International
Medical-Care Reform, 40 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 881, 891 (2002).
40. I.e., as measured by total spending.
41. THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH POLICY: A
CLINICAL APPROACH 1 (4th ed. 2005).
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that the system as currently structured is inherently unfair and requires
restructuring—Havighurst and Richman’s indictment is echoed by those on the
left who advocate single-payer national health insurance.42
III
THE POLITICS OF UNFAIRNESS
The seemingly endless litany of inequities in American medical care begs
the question of why the U.S. health care system is so unfair. If health care
financing arrangements are profoundly regressive and if so many Americans are
hurt by those arrangements, then why does this unequal state of affairs persist?
And why do we tolerate apparent excess health spending in the face of visible
deprivation in access to care?43
The easy answer, of course, is that American political culture values liberty
over equity, cherishes markets and individual responsibility over government
and social solidarity, and therefore tolerates with equanimity substantial
inequality in many spheres, including health care. From this perspective, we
have the health care system that we want.44 This argument is not lightly
dismissed, yet the implications of American political culture for health policy
are more complex than the above stereotype suggests. It is worth remembering
that opinion polls indicate that health care is different: most Americans
recognize a right to health care,45 and compared to other social distresses, they
are less likely to view illness as a matter of individual failing and are more likely
to favor government intervention.46
Politically, the answer is that however regressive or inequitable the current
health care system is, powerful interest groups literally profit from the status
quo and consequently have a strong incentive to keep things as they are. After
all, national health expenditures equal somebody else’s income, and the
recipients of that income can be expected to fight to maintain it. The $1.9
trillion the United States spends on medical care47 guarantees the presence of a

42. For an example of single-payer models see The Physician’s Working Group for Single-Payer
National Health Insurance, Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National
Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003).
43. Havighurst and Richman, supra note 6, at 54–56, emphasize the political consequences of the
tax subsidy for employer-sponsored insurance in explaining this puzzle; here I present my own
explanations for the persistence of regressive financing, followed in the next section by commentary on
their political analysis.
44. Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Health Reform: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good
Plans?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-391, W3-395.
45. For example, in a 2004 Kaiser/Newshour survey, seventy-six percent of Americans agreed that
access to health care should be a right. Kaiser Family Foundation, Spotlight: Health Care Should Be
Provided Equally to Everyone, http://kff.org/spotlight/uninsured/6.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
46. Mark Schlesinger & Taeku Lee, Is Health Care Different? Popular Support of Federal Health
and Social Policies, in THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 297, 334 (James A. Morone & Gary
S. Belkin eds., 1994).
47. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent Slowdown Led by Prescription
Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 186 (2006).
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well-funded stakeholder lobby committed to maintaining the generous flow of
funds to the health care sector. Put simply, more spending on medical care
means more revenues for those who provide care and sell medical services and
technology.48 Cost containment, whether on behalf of the government or
private insurance, whether through administered pricing or managed care, and
whether in the name of social goals or corporate profits, simply means income
reduction to this lobby. Government efforts to control costs are sure to catalyze
political opposition, while it is unclear what constituency in favor of savings can
be mobilized. Even market-based cost controls, such as managed care
arrangements, are not immune to the pressures of stakeholders who can
respond both politically and economically to private-sector efforts to curtail
spending on medical care.
A comprehensive review of the institutional biases of American political
arrangements is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that
fragmented political institutions provide ample opportunities for these lobbies
and opposing political forces to block health care reform in a system biased
towards incrementalism.49 These same institutions make it difficult to generate
and sustain a legislative majority in Congress for any one reform plan.50 Even
when a President who favors health reform and whose party has a majority in
Congress is in office, there is no guarantee that comprehensive reform will
succeed, as the Clinton administration discovered during 1993–1994.51 If the
United States had a parliamentary system, national health insurance arguably
would have passed long ago. Unfortunately for health reformers, they continue
to live in a political world that has no parliament but is governed instead by
separation of powers, shifting coalitions, and fragmented authority.
Given these institutional constraints and the dynamics of interest-group
politics, it is hardly surprising that the politics of health care have not produced
cost containment or universal coverage in the United States. This is an
imbalanced political arena, one in which the uninsured and their allies have
proven no match for the health care industry. Indeed, the modern U.S. health
care system was established on terms favorable to the medical profession: no
national health insurance, private health insurance that did not control costs or
interfere with physicians’ clinical autonomy, barriers for prepaid group
practices and alternative forms of insurance, and circumscribed authority for
other health professionals that might compete with doctors.52 The American
Medical Association opposed both private and public insurance, and when
private and public insurance programs finally were adopted they reflected

48. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., The Politics of Medical Inflation, in POLITICAL ANALYSIS
information on the imbalanced political markets
and their implications for health care.
49. For a more extensive discussion, see Oberlander, supra note 44, at W3-393 to -396.
50. Id. at W3-393 to -394.
51. SKOCPOL, supra note 2.
52. STARR, supra note 1.
AND AMERICAN MEDICAL CARE 61, 64–70 (1983) for
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major concessions to medical providers. Medicare, for instance, essentially gave
doctors and hospitals a blank check through lenient reimbursement policies
designed to secure their participation in the program when it began operations
in 1966.53 The United States, then, has traditionally been a physician’s paradise,
and altering those favorable arrangements, as managed care plans found out the
hard way, is no easy task.
Yet the health care industry is not the only group that has benefited from
the inequitable American system of financing medical care. Eighty-four
percent of Americans are insured.54 Well-insured Americans enjoy ready access
to state-of-the-art medicine and a broad choice of providers, with most of the
costs apparently paid by their employers. Most Americans like their own
medical care arrangements, even as they are critical of the health care system.55
And they want to spend more, not less, on health.56 This is not an altogether
irrational proposition, as David Cutler has shown, because key advances in
clinical medicine made available to insured Americans have produced real gains
in health outcomes and quality of life.57
Similarly, although the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored health
insurance premiums is widely derided for its regressive consequences and for
obscuring the burden of rising health care costs, the political fact is that middleand upper-class Americans enjoy tremendous financial benefits from this
program.58 Moreover, the wealthier the employee, the greater the value of the
tax exclusion. Although not exactly the hallmark of progressive financing, this
is a political cornerstone that makes the current policy difficult to dislodge. For
at least two decades, policymakers and analysts have entertained the idea of
capping or eliminating this tax subsidy.59 That this has never actually come to
pass reveals how strongly the politics of the tax subsidy lean toward the status
quo. It is doubtful that many Americans understand how the tax subsidy for
employer-provided health insurance works or even know that it exists. But they
would likely immediately understand any policy that ended or sharply limited

53. JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 108–11 (2003).
54. U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
hlthins/hlthin04/hlth04asc.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).
55. Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans’ Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year
Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 33, 40–41, 43–44.
56. Id.
57. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE (2004). Cutler argues that advances in care
for heart attacks, depression, and premature infants have produced sizable health gains—gains that
from an economic perspective, more than justify the costs of spending more on medical care.
58. See Sheils & Haught, supra note 34.
59. See Robert B. Helms, Tax Reform and Health Insurance, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK (Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050203_HPOJang.pdf. Helms discusses a proposal to cap this tax
exclusion during the Reagan administration. President Bush’s advisory panel on federal tax reform has
revived this idea by proposing to cap the tax exclusion at the average cost for health insurance
premiums. See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE FAIR, AND PROGROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 80–82 (2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/.
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the scope of the tax subsidy and significantly raised their taxes. Tax
expenditures can live on in obscurity for an eternity; in contrast, the political
costs of visible tax increases are sufficiently burdensome that they often never
see the light of day.60 However regressive or inefficient the tax exclusion for
employer-sponsored health insurance may be on the whole, it is beneficial for
large segments of the population, who are precisely those Americans more
likely to vote.61
For the well-heeled and well-insured, then, the health care system seems to
work quite well; for many Americans, the uninsured and rising health care costs
are distant issues that become problems only if they directly erode the insured’s
own access to affordable insurance and state-of-the-art medicine.62
Instructively, the implosion of managed care removed barriers to care for the
well-insured while exacerbating the plight of the uninsured by abetting the
return of higher rates of growth in medical spending.63 Havighurst and Richman
are right that employees’ acceptance of the status quo and preference for more
medical care is partly built on ignorance: workers do not seem to understand
that the rising health care bill is coming out of their wages—because total
employer health care costs are a portion of their gross compensation package—
and thus is hurting them.64 But in health politics ignorance is bliss. Americans
are quite happy with all the health care they can get as long as they believe
someone else is paying the tab. This is not an illusion they want to end; life in
the health care version of the Matrix65 is too comfortable.
The puzzling persistence of regressive financing in American medical care
is, in the end, not so puzzling. The American health care system is selfperpetuating—despite recurrent declarations of crisis and worries about its
egalitarian and economic shortcomings—precisely because there is a
considerable segment of the population and economy that benefit from the
system while others suffer. Arguments about the immorality or unfair

60. These political dynamics are illustrated by the Clinton administration’s efforts to enact
universal coverage without significantly raising taxes; one political advantage of an employer mandate
is that is privatizes (and thus hides) financing as an alternative to public taxes. On Clinton’s desire to
avoid being labeled as a “taxer” see SKOCPOL, supra note 2, at 40–46.
61. Voting rates climb with income. In the 2004 presidential elections, voters with incomes over
$75,000 were twice as likely to vote as those with incomes below $10,000. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, tbl. 9, http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). Moreover, sixty-seven percent of
insured Americans aged eighteen to sixty-four reported voting in the 2000 elections, compared to only
forty-five percent of uninsured voters. Kaiser Family Foundation, Public Opinion Spotlight: The
Uninsured and Voting, http://www.kff.org/spotlight/elections/9.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
62. However, insured Americans may not appreciate how vulnerable they and their families are to
losing health insurance over time. A Families USA study found that in 2002-2003 one out of every
three Americans under age sixty-five was without health insurance at some point during that period.
FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, 20022003 (2004), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/82million_uninsured_report6fdc.pdf.
63. On the fall of managed care see generally James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285
JAMA 2622, 2627–28 (2001).
64. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 54–56.
65. See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Studios & Village Roadshow Pictures 1999).

12__OBERLANDER.DOC

256

3/7/2007 4:01 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:245

distributional consequences of this system, including those that highlight the
fate of the low-income insured, are unlikely to persuade those who profit
financially and benefit medically from the status quo to abdicate their privileged
positions. Tolerating inequality, after all, is a hallmark of American political
life.66 And on those rare occasions when such arguments do prevail, or when
the broader public is mobilized and political conditions are ripe for change, the
bias of American political institutions towards incrementalism works against
comprehensive reform.
IV
WHAT DOES THE TAX SUBSIDY HAVE TO DO WITH IT?
Havighurst and Richman’s explanation of health politics alternatively
emphasizes the impact of the tax subsidy. They argue that the tax subsidy hides
the true cost of health coverage because workers do not understand that rising
health premiums are coming out of their wages through employers’ undisclosed
reduction in their overall compensation packages.67 As a result of these costs
being hidden in employer purchasing, the authors contend, workers demand
more health care than their true interests would allow and allocate more to
health insurance than they would rationally choose. Havighurst and Richman
cite the failure of bare-bones insurance policies to develop much of a market
presence as an example of the distorting effects of the tax subsidy.68 They argue
that the tax subsidy also biases politics by giving “consumer-voters” little
incentive to question the excessive regulations that protect providers, or the
ever-rising flow of funds to the health care industry.69 Furthermore, regulations
like occupational licensure and mandated minimum benefits for health
insurance foreclose the opportunity for people to economize by purchasing
lower-cost health care coverage—coverage they might prefer and that might
enhance their welfare.
Instead, Havighurst and Richman contend that standard comprehensive
health insurance policies are designed by and for elites and the medical
industry. These groups benefit financially from prevailing regulatory and legal
systems that obscure the high costs of American medical care70—put another
way, what you don’t see is what the health care industry gets. Thus Havighurst
and Richman argue that another dimension of lower- and middle-income
Americans overpaying for health insurance and getting a raw deal from the

66. The United States has a higher rate of inequality than any other rich nation in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development. Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy and Economic
Inequality: The United States in Comparative Perspective, (Feb. 20, 2004) (paper presented at the
Campbell Public Affairs Institute’s seminar on “Inequality and American Democracy”), available at
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Events/Smeeding.pdf.
67. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 54.
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id. at 54–56.
70. Id. at 71–82.
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system is that they are “forced to buy more . . . or better quality [medical care]
than they can reasonably afford.”71
What should we make of this argument? Ignorance surely does play a role
(though not necessarily the dominant one) in the politics of health care: if more
Americans understood how the tax subsidy works and who is really paying for
their health insurance, perhaps there would be a stronger constituency for cost
control.72 Nonetheless, I believe Havighurst and Richman’s assertion that the
tax subsidy is to blame for high costs and comprehensive insurance in the U.S. is
overstated,73 and their presumption that low-income workers want less and
lower-quality health insurance is wrong.
The authors do not note that the United States is hardly unique in having
comprehensive health insurance; in fact, it is common in industrialized
democracies.74 Thus the development of comprehensive insurance in the U.S.
may have much less to do with any consequences of the tax subsidy than with
these facts: (1) people want comprehensive coverage; (2) they value health
security; and (3) they are uncomfortable with the risk and uncertainty of high
cost-sharing. Otherwise how do we explain the international embrace of
comprehensive coverage? In other words, the causality that Havighurst and
Richman posit may be reversed: the desire for comprehensive health insurance
may be an explanation for and not a result of the tax subsidy. International
experience suggests that were it not for the tax subsidy Americans likely would
have found an alternative mechanism to deliver comprehensive insurance.
In this context, Havighurst and Richman’s discussion of bare-bones
insurance policies75 is telling in that they do not discuss perhaps the most
obvious reason for their failure to develop in the market: people do not like
limited health insurance and do not regard radically low-cost policies as real
insurance. If the market reveals preferences, then it appears that most

71. Id. at 73.
72. It would be a mistake, though, to assume that the tax subsidy eliminates all pressures for cost
control in private insurance. In particular, regardless of the economic evidence on wages, employers
have tried very hard to control the costs of health insurance premiums, though without sustained
success, at least judging by the historical record of premium increases.
73. Paul Starr writes, “No one who has studied the takeoff of private insurance in the 1950s and
1950s. . .” would accept that the growth and liberalization of private health insurance during that time
was primarily due to the tax exclusion of employer-sponsored insurance. Paul Starr, On the Origins
and Cure of Warped Incentives, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 121
(Mancur Olson ed., 1981). “Tax considerations were a relatively minor factor at the time”; instead,
health insurance represented a private form of social security that unions could claim as a “virtue of
collective bargaining” and that employers could use to strengthen worker loyalties. Id. Starr goes on to
write that “the extent of the plans responded to the workers’ demand for an inclusive system of
prepayment, with certainty of coverage, rather than merely insurance against major risks.” Id.
74. On international health systems, see generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What
They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004), and JOSEPH WHITE,
COMPETING SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
(1995). White notes that “within this context of universal and compulsory coverage, all systems provide
roughly equal standard benefits, with Japan’s varied cost sharing the major exception.” Id. at 272.
75. They write that “there is implausibly little discernible demand for radically low-cost health
coverage.” Havigurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 75.
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Americans do not prefer the economizing options that the authors see as
missing in the current system.
Similarly, Havighurst and Richman do not present any compelling evidence
that low-income workers want lower-quality, more-limited health insurance.
The notion that something is wrong because “lower- and middle-income
premium payers are unable, under current legal, regulatory, and market
conditions, to opt for low-cost coverage that limits their potential access to new
or other high-cost technologies”76 seems more grounded in the authors’
preferences for economizing options than in the actual hopes and desires of the
working class. It is doubtful that lower-income Americans believe it is an
injustice that more of them are not in lower-quality insurance plans with less
access to state-of-the-art medicine than their more affluent compatriots.
Instead of more-limited insurance, is it not rational for workers of modest
means to prefer comprehensive insurance paid for on a progressive financing
basis by others? Instead of economizing choices, might uninsured workers
instead prefer access to comprehensive national health insurance? Might not
low-income workers also support regulations for occupational licensure and
mandated minimum benefits that they believe promote quality care? And were
low-income workers to wind up disproportionately in insurance plans that
denied them access to the latest medical technologies, would the distributive
injustices of financing not simply be replaced by a new injustice that, in essence,
placed a higher value on the lives of those with higher incomes?77
Comprehensive insurance is not, as Havighurst and Richman would have it,
designed simply for political elites and the health care industry or as a result of
the tax subsidy’s obscuring the true costs of health coverage—this is where their
political analysis falls short. Rather, comprehensive insurance represents an
understandable and predictable response to the insecurity and uncertainty
created by illness and the high costs of medical care, and it cannot be presumed
that low-income Americans want to be liberated from the “burden” of having
good health insurance, even if they would whole-heartedly support reform of
how that health insurance is paid for.
V
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH CARE
Given how regressive American health policy already is, it is hard to believe
it could become any more inequitable. Alas, that is exactly the direction in
which the system appears poised to go.78 The newest magic bullet in American

76. Id. at 27.
77. Indeed, Havighurst and Richman are not generally concerned “that health care is rationed or
distributed unequally” but instead that cost sharing may lead lower-income insurance enrollees to get
fewer benefits for equivalent premiums. Id. at 43. However, a more egalitarian moral vision would
find it quite problematic that medical technology was rationed according to income.
78. In this section I am commenting on the direction of U.S. health policy, not on the prescriptions
of Havighurst and Richman. The authors are ambivalent about consumer-directed health care. They
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health policy, succeeding managed care, is consumer-directed health care.
Under the rubric of consumerism, a variety of trends are touted, including the
proliferation of Web-based medical information and Internet technology that
allow employees to tailor their own custom-made health-benefits packages,
cost-sharing arrangements, and provider networks.79 In this vision of health
care, patients are no longer just patients, but rather take on the role of
sophisticated consumers who use newfound information and the Internet to
comparison shop and make informed choices about their medical care,
presumably much as they would in choosing between alternative vacation
packages.
Yet the central instruments of consumer-driven health care are highdeductible health insurance plans (HDHPs) and tax-preferred Health Savings
Accounts (HSAs) that are used to pay for “routine” expenditures until the
deductible is met, at which point the HDHP’s catastrophic coverage kicks in.
Under current law, people must purchase insurance plans with a minimum
deductible of $1050 for an individual or $2100 for a family to qualify for
establishing an HSA.80 Once established, individuals or their employers (or
both) can deposit pre-tax dollars into HSAs (though the amount deposited
cannot exceed the deductible) and those funds can be invested, with unused
money rolled over to the next year.81 Funds can then be withdrawn from the
HSA, tax free, to pay for qualified medical expenses.82 HSAs are portable,
meaning workers can keep the accounts when they change employers.83
The core idea behind HSAs and HDHPs is that by making patients more
cost-conscious (through high deductibles), they will become more pricesensitive consumers and consequently consume less medical care, particularly of
the discretionary variety.84 The diagnosis proffered by advocates of consumerdriven health care (one shared by Havighurst and Richman) is that health care
costs are high due to overinsurance and overutilization because patients do not
confront financial incentives to economize on health care.85 The proposed cure
is consequently to provide patients with financial incentives to use fewer
praise its potential to combat the problems of over-insurance and moral hazard and appear to like its
shifting of more costs to individuals. However, they also sharply criticize some of the regressive
features of Health Savings Accounts discussed here and note HSAs may not serve the interests of lowincome patients. See id. at 38–39, 39 n.96.
79. Jon R. Gabel, Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They
More than Talk Now?, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W395, W395–96, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.395v1.pdf.
80. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
public-affairs/hsa/ (last visited March 9, 2006).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, for example, the description of Health Savings Accounts in Aetna, Health Savings
Accounts (HSAs), ISSUE AT A GLANCE (Aetna, Hartford, Conn.), July 2005, available at
http://www.aetna.com/public_policy_issues/data/HSA_IssueATAGlance_Rev.pdf.
85. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral Hazard Myth, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44, 47–
48.
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medical services. In addition, because these insurance plans carry higher
deductibles, they may also come with lower premiums, thereby offering an
insurance product that is more affordable than conventional plans.
The appeal of HSAs—generating, at least in theory, both cost savings and
healthier behaviors, promoting values of personal responsibility and consumer
empowerment, and invoking the politics of tax cuts and private investment—is
easily understood. HSAs are the centerpiece of President Bush’s health care
policy and are in harmony with his ownership society; accordingly, the President
recently proposed new subsidies designed to promote their adoption in the nongroup insurance market.86 High-deductible health plans also have been
growing, albeit from a small base, in the employer-sponsored insurance
market,87 and that growth is likely to continue, if not accelerate.
The problem, from the perspective of health care financing, is that HSAs
and high-deductible plans could exacerbate the regressive character of
American health policy. These plans are highly regressive in two respects.
First, as Havighurst and Richman note, their tax-preferred provisions are of
substantially greater value to wealthier Americans in high tax brackets; lowincome Americans not only fail to receive the same tax benefits, but they also
have less disposable income than higher-income workers to contribute to their
HSAs.88 In a polity where recent tax cuts have favored the wealthiest
Americans, HSAs would add yet another regressive tax shelter to benefit
financially those who least need the help.89
The second sense in which HSAs are potentially regressive is in their impact
on the sick and chronically ill. For healthy Americans, HSAs could amount to a
good deal if these policies offered the prospect of lower premiums and, for the
wealthy, the lure of accumulating tax-free funds. If one rarely uses medical
care, then the high deductible is not an issue. But for patients who are not

86. Sarah Rubenstein, Is an HSA Right for You?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2006, at D1.
87. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 94 exhibit 8.1 (2005), available at http://kff.org/insurance/
7315/upload/7315.pdf.
88. Havighurst and Richman, supra note 6, at 39 n.96; Milt Freudenhiem, Though Enrollment
Grows, Many Don’t Bother to Save, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C1. The Government Accountability
Office reports that in 2004 the average amount of tax deduction claimed by HSA enrollees—that is, the
amount individuals contributed to their HSAs—increased with income. U.S. GAO, PUBL’N NO. GAO06-798, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: EARLY ENROLLEE EXPERIENCES WITH HEALTH
SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS
AND
ELIGIBLE
HEALTH
PLANS
22
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06798.pdf;
see also CATHERINE HOFFMAN & JENNIFER TOLBERT, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: ARE THEY AN
OPTION
FOR
LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES?
(2006),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7568.pdf.
On the differential tax value of HSAs, Hoffman and Tolbert write that “[a] family of four with income
of $20,000 would receive no benefit from contributing to an HSA. In contrast, a family of four with
income of $120,000 gains $620 in tax savings from a $2,000 HSA contribution . . . .” Id. at 14.
89. See Robert Pear, Health Care, Vexing to Clinton, is Now at Top of Bush’s Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2006, at 1 (reporting that economist Jonathan Gruber believes the Bush insurance “tax breaks
would be expensive and regressive, offering the largest benefits to the highest-income taxpayers”).
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healthy, the high deductible means they will pay significant amounts out of their
own pockets for medical care and will be hard-pressed to accumulate any
savings in HSAs because they will have to deplete those funds to pay for their
medical expenses. Traditionally, the healthy subsidize the sick in insurance
pools, but HSAs and HDHPs reverse this principal of insurance by shifting the
burden of health care financing to those who use medical care the most.90 The
flip side of responsibility and consumer cost-consciousness is that under HSA
arrangements, the sick are punished financially simply for being sick and using
more medical care. Consumer control of health expenses consequently might
amount to little more than cost-shifting onto the shoulders of the sick. Not only
is this morally repugnant, but it also makes little medical sense to discourage
patients with expensive chronic conditions from seeking primary care.
Additionally, HSAs threaten to further undermine risk-pooling and the ethic of
collective responsibility in American health care; if healthier individuals leave
insurance pools for HSAs, sicker persons may be left to pay higher premiums in
traditional plans.91
Moreover, HSAs are unlikely to achieve much progress in covering the
uninsured. High deductibles are not attractive to many low-income uninsured
persons who will still find the premiums hard to afford and who will look
skeptically at the financial risk imposed by high deductibles. HSAs could also
have unanticipated consequences for employer-based coverage.
Health
economist Jonathan Gruber estimates that President Bush’s proposals to
expand HSAs would actually increase the number of uninsured because new tax
policies would lead many private employers to drop health insurance coverage.92
In sum, HSAs will not ameliorate the distributive injustices and inequalities
in American health care; they will only make them worse, redistributing even
more advantages to the healthy and wealthy while penalizing the sick and poor.
In other words, HSAs are a perfect embodiment of the perverse moral logic and
political economy of U.S. health policy, which explains their current political
appeal. The American response to the crisis of the uninsured is, bizarrely, to
propose solutions that make people less insured.93 If HSAs spread, there is a
strong possibility that an already regressive health care system will become even
more regressive in coming years.

90. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Some Observations on High-Deductible Health Insurance Policies (Nov. 1,
2004) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
91. Victor Fuchs, What’s Ahead for Health Insurance in the United States, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1822–24 (2002). As Fuchs notes, the spread of consumer-driven plans could erode the crosssubsidization in health care that comes from healthier enrollees subsidizing sicker persons. If healthier
employees leave traditional insurance plans for HSAs, those traditional plans will be left with a sicker
risk pool and will have to charge higher premiums.
92. Jonathan Gruber, Ctr. on Budget Policy Priorities, The Cost and Coverage Impact of the
President’s Health Insurance Budget Proposals (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-1506health.pdf.
93. Gladwell, supra note 85, at 44, 47–48.
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VI
CONCLUSION: CAN MARKETS GIVE US
94
THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM WE WANT?
Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman provide a compelling indictment of
the American health care system and its distributive injustices. They deserve
much credit for calling attention to an often-neglected issue: the regressive
mechanisms of financing private health insurance that disadvantage working
Americans of modest means. As a solution to these problems, they clearly
prefer market-based health reforms, and they voice “some confidence” that
with deregulation, altered incentives and subsidies that enable consumers to
freely choose their own style of medical care, and redesigned insurance
products, the market could evolve to address the distributive injustices they
highlight.95 However, and surprisingly given the rest of their analysis,
Havighurst and Richman “would not object if [their] observation of the major
burdens imposed on consumers by private health insurance were cited as a
reason to adopt a monolithic national health program, scrapping private health
insurance altogether (except insofar as it might supplement the national
system’s coverage).”96 This is for them a second-best alternative, yet it
represents an option they concede may become necessary if political forces
intervene and frustrate market-based reforms.97
I believe Havighurst and Richman’s preferred market-based strategy is
likely to fail in redressing distributive injustices in health care; the problem in
U.S. health policy is not with politicians distorting the market, but with the
market itself. Indeed, Havighurst and Richman’s documentation of injustices in
the health care system supports an alternative conclusion: markets are
inherently regressive, and the most important explanation for why the financing
of medical care in the United States is unfair is that we have left much of its
financing to markets. As a result, only some sort of national health insurance
program is capable of making the U.S. health care system more progressive
both in financing and utilization.
After all, what distinguishes the United States’ health care from that of most
other industrialized countries is the extent to which we rely on for-profit private
insurance. Among industrialized democracies, only Switzerland and the United
States fund their systems mostly through private sources (encompassing private
insurance and direct out-of-pocket payments by patients).98 Not surprisingly,
Switzerland and the United States have been found to have the most regressive
health financing systems among these nations, with the poor paying

94. This title is borrowed from Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?,
22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 383 (1997).
95. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 79.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 81.
98. THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 254 (2d ed. 2003).
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proportionately more than in countries such as France and the United Kingdom
that rely more heavily on taxes to fund medical services.99
Markets ration by price and ability to pay, and the American experience
demonstrates that they are predictably regressive in their distributional
implications for medical care. There is no mechanism available to force health
care markets to become more progressive in financing medical care and no
reason to believe they will change for the better in this regard, short of
government intervention. Nor is one of Havighurst and Richman’s favored
solutions—separating out low-income workers from higher-income workers in
the same company and placing them into their own insurance pools—likely to
work.100 Indeed, this proposal is neither feasible nor desirable. Havighurst and
Richman explain that separate pools would offer lower-income workers
coverage with income-related (and thus lower) cost-sharing, but also with less
comprehensive coverage than their wealthier co-workers would enjoy, thus
exacerbating inequality in medical care.101
However, health status is correlated with income,102 and it is not likely that
insurers will be ecstatic about pools that by definition have a higher
concentration of worse risks in them. For all their vices, and there are many,
large employer pools do have the virtue of spreading risk. Moreover,
Havighurst and Richman do not emphasize the main pathway of crosssubsidization in insurance pools, which flows not from the poor to the wealthy
but from the healthy to the very sick—five percent of patients account for fiftyfive percent of health expenditures.103 If private insurance pools were
segmented by income and if low-income pools attracted disproportionately
sicker populations (a real possibility, given that health status is correlated with
income), their financial viability could be threatened. Finally, one need look no
further than Medicaid and the experiences of its low-income beneficiaries losing
coverage in states like Tennessee to appreciate that isolating the poor into their
own insurance programs carries with it significant political liabilities.104
In short, if the central goal is to make the financing of health services more
progressive in the United States, markets simply will not do the job. They are
part of the problem, not the solution, and if we continue to rely on markets in
health care, they will continue to produce more uninsured, more health care
spending, and more inequality. That is the inescapable conclusion of the history
of U.S. health policy and (even if they do not fully embrace it) of Havighurst

99. Id.
100. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 6, at 45.
101. Id. at 46 (stating plans might not “undertak[e] to cover everything deemed ‘medically
necessary’”).
102. Nancy E. Adler & Katherine Newman, Socioeconomic Disparities in Health: Pathways and
Policies, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 60, 62–64.
103. Marc L. Berc and Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures Revisited,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 9, 12.
104. See Emily Berry, Tenn. Care Cuts Some “Sickest, Neediest,” CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, Dec. 4, 2005, at A1.
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and Richman’s analysis. As a consequence, the authors’ preferred solution of
market-based reform is likely to fail, though not for the reasons they delineate;
instead, their second-best solution—a government health plan—is the only
viable solution to the problems they document. In the end, if Americans are
truly serious about correcting the regressive nature of their health care system,
they will have to look away from markets, in a direction many will not be
comfortable with, to find a framework for progressive financing—namely,
toward tax-financed national health insurance.105

105. The progressive character of tax-financed national health insurance depends on what mix of
taxes is used to fund it. But tax-funded national health insurance provides a framework to pursue more
equitable financing of health care, something that health care markets cannot do. Similarly, national
health plans cannot assure that the positive correlation between income and medical-care utilization
that Havighurst and Richman hypothesize exists in private insurance—an eminently plausible
hypothesis that awaits more empirical evidence—will disappear. But they offer the potential of
reducing that disparity inasmuch as they eliminate financial barriers to care, a prospect that private
health insurance does not hold. Indeed, some studies have found that lower-income Canadians receive
more medical services than their wealthier compatriots, the reverse of the situation in the United
States. BODENHEIMER & GURMBACH, supra note 41, at 48. On the relationship between income and
utilization of medical care services, see Eddy van Doorslaer, Cristina Masseria & Xander Koolman,
OCED Health Equity Research Group, Inequalities in Access to Medical Care by Income in Developed
Countries, 174 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 177, 177 (2006) (“We found inequity in physician utilization
favouring patients who are better off in about half of the OECD countries studied. . . . In most
countries, we found no evidence of inequity in the distribution of general practioner visits across
income groups, and where it does occur it often indicates pro-poor distribution. However, in all
countries for which data are available, after controlling for need differences, people with higher
incomes are significantly more likely to see a specialist than people with lower incomes, and in most
countries, also more frequently.”).

